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Abstract 
The Euro crisis has had a contradictory impact on European policy-making. It has led to a massive 
transfer of authority to the European level in areas such as macroeconomic policy and banking 
regulation, which have enormous implications over a large range of public policies. This attempt at 
reinforcing depoliticized governance has, in turn, dramatically enhanced the domestic salience of EU 
membership and hostility to European integration, notably in domestic elections. In parallel, however, 
one has witnessed an attempt at reinforcing the accountability of European institutions with the so-called 
Spitzenkandidaten system. While the result of these contrasting forces remains to be seen, it has to date 
aggravated the European democracy conundrum: the Union and its policies are more present in domestic 
political debates, but they are increasingly contested. 
Keywords 
Supranationalism, Euro Crisis, Democratic Deficit 
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  1 
Ten years after the outbreak of the euro crisis, i.e. the economic and financial turmoil that followed the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, it appears clear that this series of events has had a lasting impact on 
European policy-making, and possibly on European politics. According to a long-held view of EU 
policy-making, the latter is characterised by the absence of politicisation. European policies are 
generally seen as shaped primarily by the interaction of national and European bureaucracies with 
stakeholders of various kinds.1 
European elections are described as ‘second-order elections’ that unfold according to the template 
established by the first direct election of members of the European Parliament in 1979: candidates are 
selected by national parties and national issues dominate both the campaign and the vote.2 The lack of 
a strong European party system and the almost complete absence of ‘parties at the European level’—to 
use the language of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—have also been emphasised.3 
The vast literature on the catchall concept of Europeanisation has focused on Europe’s influence over 
domestic policies, rather than over national political systems. In his 2000 study of the impact of 
European integration on national party systems, Peter Mair identified a gap between the actual 
responsibilities of the European Union and its Member States, and the themes that are at the heart of 
electoral competition at each of these levels. Major decisions on the direction and scope of the 
integration process, he argued, continue to be central in European elections even though the European 
Parliament, despite its repeated requests, had little influence over these issues. Conversely, national 
elections continued to be dominated by confrontations on ‘national’ policy issues even though these 
were increasingly shaped by choices made at the European level. As a result, wrote Mair, voter choices 
only had a limited impact on important decisions made at both levels. 
Since this diagnosis was made, however, a number of works have suggested that domestic politics 
are increasingly influenced by developments at the European level. This evolution is said to affect both 
the behaviour of parties as well as that of voters. As regards the former, expert surveys and manifesto 
data have shown that European issues have become more salient for political parties across the Union.4 
In some instances, dissent was so strong that it led to the emergence of new political parties, such as 
Front de gauche in France or ANEL in Greece.5 With regard to electoral behaviour, a number of scholars 
suggest we might be shifting to a new era, as contestation over European issues has appeared at the 
national level. Van der Eijk and Franklin have evoked the image of the ‘sleeping giant’: whereas voters 
increasingly have clearer attitudes towards the EU, political parties tend to downplay European issues 
since the latter are fairly divisive for their traditional base.6 However, they argue, the issue is now ‘ripe 
for politicisation’: ‘it is only a matter of time before policy entrepreneurs in some countries seize the 
                                                     
1 Claudio Radaelli, Technocracy in the European Union (London: Longman, 1999). 
2 Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis 
of European Election Results,” European Journal of Political Research 8, no. 1 (1980): 3-44. 
3 Luciano Bardi et at., “How to Create a Transnational Party System,” European Parliament, 2010, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14744/StudyTransnationalPartySystem.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; 
Thomas Poguntke et al., “The Europeanisation of National Party Organisations: A Conceptual Analysis,” European Journal 
of Political Research 46, no. 6 (2007): 747-71.  
4 Marco R. Steenbergen and David J. Scott, “Contesting Europe? The Salience European Integration as a Party Issue,” in 
European Integration and Political Conflict, eds. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 165-92.  
5 Front de gauche in France was created following the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty and the Independent 
Greeks (ANEL) was formed in reaction to the first set of austerity measures contained in the bailout memorandum imposed 
by the EU in 2010-2011. 
6 Cees Van Der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin, “Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe,” 
in European Integration and Political Conflict, eds. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 32-50. 
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opportunity…to differentiate themselves from other parties in EU terms.’7 Writing a few years later, 
Hooghe and Marks stress that European integration is increasingly becoming the focus of high-profile 
political debate at the domestic level.8 The elites have had ‘to make room for a more of strategic 
interaction among party elites in their contest for political power.’9 As a result, they argue, the future of 
Europe is more likely to be shaped by political conflict than by the functionalist, efficiency-driven 
pressures that played a crucial role in the first decades of the integration process. A number of studies 
have documented the development of contestation over European issues in some countries at the time 
of national elections, stressing inter alia that the salience of EU related issues played a key role in cross-
national variations.10  
Although these analyses predate the economic and financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008, there are good reasons to believe that this crisis has acted as a catalyst for 
further politicization. It has led to a massive transfer of authority to the European level in an area, 
macroeconomic policy, which has enormous re-distributive implications and has a radiating influence 
over a large range of public policies. This, in turn, has dramatically enhanced the domestic salience of 
EU membership because of the central role that European decisions have played in successive rescue 
packages and in the development of fiscal austerity. The purpose of this paper is to review the manifold 
influences of the euro crisis over EU policy-making. I will argue that the crisis has, in several respects, 
aggravated the well-known legitimacy problem of the European Union by triggering an attempt at 
further depoliticising major EU policies, despite the overt opposition of European leaders to further 
transfers of authority to the EU (Part I). This has fed hostility to European integration, notably in 
domestic elections (Part II). In parallel, however, one has witnessed an attempt at reinforcing the 
accountability of European institutions with the so-called Spitzenkandidaten system, discussed in Part 
III. While the result of these contrasting forces remains to be seen, it has to date aggravated the European 
democracy conundrum: the Union and its policies are, yes, more present in domestic political debates, 
but the normative principles underlying their legitimacy remain both unclear and disputed. 
I. The Attempt at Depoliticising Macroeconomic Policy  
The European response to the euro crisis, slow and piecemeal as it may have been,11 has nonetheless led 
to a substantial consolidation of European economic governance.12 A first part of the reform was to set 
up backstop devices aiming to assist countries threatened by default, culminating in the creation of the 
European Stability Mechanism in 2012. From the very beginning, however, in exchange for their 
solidarity ‘creditor countries’ demanded a significant tightening of the surveillance system to prevent 
the resurgence of similar problems in the future. In slightly over a year, this led to the adoption of two 
important legislative packages (the ‘Six Pack’ and the ‘Two Pack’), and a new treaty—the 'Fiscal 
Compact' imposed by Chancellor Merkel. While this is not the place for a systematic analysis of these 
                                                     
7 Van Der Eijk and Franklin, “Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe,” 47. 
8 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to 
Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2009): 1-23. 
9 Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration,” 9. 
10 Matthew J. Gabel, “European Integration, Voters, and National Politics,” West European Politics 23, no. 4 (2000): 52-72; 
Erik R. Tillman, “The European Union at the Ballot Box? European Integration and Voting Behavior in the New Member 
States,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 5 (2004): 590-610; Catherine E. De Vries, “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale? 
How European Integration Affects Vote Choice in National Elections,” European Union Politics 8, no. 3 (2007): 363-85; 
Catherine E. De Vries, “EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability? How European Integration Affects Parties’ Electoral 
Fortunes,” European Union Politics 11, no. 1 (2010): 89-117. 
11 Peter A. Hall, “The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis,” German Politics 21, no. 4 (2012): 355-71 
12 For a legal and constitutional analysis of these developments, see Matthias Ruffert, “The Future of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union: Issues of Constitutional Law,” this volume; for a political science analysis from the perspective of 
integration theory, see Nicolas Jabko, “Politicized Integration: The Case of the Eurozone Crisis,” this volume. 
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reforms,13 it is important to note that they significantly strengthened the Commission's hand in the 
surveillance of Member States’ fiscal policy.  
First, the scope of the Commission’s control powers was expanded far beyond public finances 
through the establishment of the macroeconomic surveillance procedure (the excessive macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure [MIP]) based on a scoreboard of indicators covering the whole of macroeconomic 
policy. In the same vein, the newly created ‘European Semester’ increased the interactions between the 
national authorities and the Commission before draft budgets are submitted.14 Finally, to ensure the 
effectiveness of the new regulatory system, there was a general shift ‘from soft law measures without 
binding consequences toward a binding framework.’15 The authority of the Commission was 
considerably enhanced to avoid a repetition of the 2004 episode, in which its recommendation of 
sanctions against France and Germany for excessive deficits were reversed by the Economic and 
Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council. Under the new framework, if the Commission deems the rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to be violated, its ‘recommendations’ become binding unless the 
Council rejects them through a qualified majority decision within ten days. This ‘reverse qualified 
majority’ system, introduced by the Six Pack and consolidated by the Fiscal Compact,16 heavily tilts the 
balance of power in favour of the Commission, whose choices are now very difficult to reverse.17 
In discussions over SGP reform, the introduction of the ‘reverse qualified majority’ was presented 
as a shift towards ‘quasi-automatic’ sanctions.18 However, this description obscures the fact that the 
enforcement mechanism involves a fair degree of discretion. This is because budget deficit targets are 
defined no longer in nominal, but in structural terms, i.e. they are to take into consideration business 
cycle swings and filter out the effects of one-off and temporary measures.19 Similarly, in the MIP, a 
negative result does not lead to the automatic conclusion that there is an imbalance, since from an 
economic standpoint it is difficult to determine the exact threshold at which a macroeconomic imbalance 
might become harmful. In other words, the attempt to refine the rules and render them less mechanical 
has enhanced the discretion enjoyed by the Commission. 
The breadth of the Commission’s margin for manoeuvre is by its very nature indeterminate.20 
Remarkably, the Commission has departed from the previous practice, in which codes of conduct on the 
                                                     
13 Michael Bauer and Stefan Becker, “The Unexpected Winner of the Crisis: The European Commission’s Strengthened Role 
in Economic Governance,” Journal of European Integration 36, no. 3 (2014): 213-29 ; Renaud Dehousse, “Le ‘Pacte 
Budgétaire’: Incertitudes Juridiques et Ambiguïté Politique,” Les Brefs de Notre Europe, no. 33 (2012): 1-4; Jean-Paul 
Keppenne, “Institutional Report,” in The Economic and Monetary Union: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the 
Economic Governance within the EU, eds. Ulla Neegaard, Catherine Jacqueson, and Jens Hartig Danielsen (Copenhagen: 
DJØF Publishing, 2014), 179-257.  
14 For a critique of the European Semester, see Philomila Tsoukala, “Post-Crisis Economic and Social Policy: Some Thoughts 
on Structural Reforms 2.0,” this volume. 
15 Keppenne, “Institutional Report,” 211. 
16 See European Parliament and Council Regulation 1173/201, On the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in 
the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1, arts. 4(2), 5(2) and 6(2), and European Parliament and Council Regulation 1174/2011, 
On Enforcement Measures to Correct Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8, art. 
3(3) [Six Pack]; see also European Parliament and Council Regulation 1303/2013, Laying Down Common Provisions on 
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, 2013 O.J. (L 347) 320, art. 
23(10). 
17 Wim van Aken and Lionel Artige, “A Comparative Analysis of Reverse Majority Voting: The WTO's Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism, the EU Anti-Dumping Policy and the Reinforced SGP and Fiscal Compact,” EUSA Thirteenth Biennial 
Conference, Baltimore, 2013. 
18 This view was expressed by the German government, the Commission and the ECB. See, e.g., Olli Rehn, Why EU Policy 
Co-ordination has Failed, and How to Fix It, The Ludwig Ehrard Lecture, October 26, 2010, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-10-590_en.htm?locale=en. 
19 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), Article 3(3) [Fiscal Compact]. 
20 Interview with Mario Buti, Director general, DG ECFIN, May 2015. 
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implementation of the SGP were endorsed by the ECOFIN Council: in January 2015, the Commission 
issued, without Council involvement, a communication detailing how it would apply the flexibility 
provisions of the SGP to encourage growth-friendly fiscal consolidation.21 Some of the decisions taken 
by the Juncker Commission in this area clearly flew in the face of Northern European ‘creditor’ 
countries’ preferences. In early 2015, for instance, it proposed that France, which had failed to meet its 
deficit target, be granted a two-year extension of the deadline to correct its excessive deficit and merely 
insisted that France carry out comprehensive and ambitious structural reforms.22 This soft policy line 
earned the Commission a scathing rebuke from Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann: 
As a lesson of the crisis the rules were stiffened somewhat. But at the same time, the Commission 
was granted more leeway in interpreting the rules. So far, the Commission has made ample use of 
this additional leeway, thereby thwarting the original intention of the rule overhaul.23 
Developments in the field of banking regulation have followed a similar path.24 At the time of the 
Maastricht Treaty, Germany and France had systematically opposed any role for the new central bank 
in supervising banks, which remained in the hands of national authorities, because the right to control 
their own market was deemed to be of central importance.25 The following two decades, however, saw 
the cross-border integration of the banking sector and the emergence of a number of large banking 
groups operating in several countries. As is known, the European banking sector was subsequently hit 
by a series of crises beginning in 2008: the credit crunch following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers; 
the turmoil deriving from banks' exposure to the sovereign debt of countries like Greece; the real estate 
bubbles in Ireland and Spain—all of which contributed to undermining public confidence in European 
banks. Thus it was recognized that a nationally based supervisory model was inadequate to oversee an 
integrated financial market in which capital could move freely and the idea of centralized bank 
supervision gained traction. In a first step, new regulatory authorities were established following 
recommendations from a high-level group of financial experts chaired by a former Banque de France 
governor.26 However, due to opposition from countries with large financial centres, the new structures 
were granted only limited competences, and their decisions were subject to the control of national 
authorities through voting and appeals procedures.27 When in the spring of 2012, Spain and Italy pushed 
heavily for a rescue package to rescue their ailing banks, ‘creditor’ countries insisted that the supervision 
of European banks be removed from the hands of national authorities and entrusted to a strong European 
regulator, and that EU regulation be tightened. Given the urgent character of the crisis, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) appeared as a more reliable alternative than the newly created authorities.28 
Once the decision was made, it took only a few months to agree on the blueprint for a Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The ECB has now become the sole decision-maker for granting or 
                                                     
21 Communication from the Commission, Making the Best Use Of The Flexibility Within The Existing Rules Of The Stability 
And Growth Pact, COM (2015) 12 final (January 13, 2015). 
22 Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation with a View to Bringing an End to the Excessive Government 
Deficit in France, COM (2015) 115 final (February 27, 2015). 
23 At the Crossroad. The Euro-Area Between Sovereignty and Solidarity, Speech delivered at Sciences Po, Paris, November 
12, 2015, http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Reden/2015/2015_11_12_weidmann.html. 
24 For a discussion of EU banking regulation highlighting the UK’s role and the international dimension, see Elliot Posner, 
“EU Financial Regulation after the Neoliberal Moment,” this volume.  
25 Mourlon-Druol, “Don’t Blame the Euro: Historical Reflections on the Roots of the Eurozone Crisis,” West European 
Politics 37, no. 6 (2014): 1282-296. 
26 De Larosière Group, “The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU,” February 25, 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication14527_en.pdf. 
27 Alexandre Hennessy, “Redesigning Financial Supervision in the European Union (2009-13),” Journal of European Public 
Policy 21, no. 2 (2014): 151-68; Lucia Quaglia, “Financial Regulation and Supervision in the European Union after the 
Crisis,” Journal of Economic Policy Reform 16, no. 1 (2013): 17-30. 
28 Renaud Dehousse, “Why has EU Macroeconomic Governance Become More Supranational?,” Journal of European 
Integration 38, no. 5 (2016): 617-31. 
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revoking banking licenses in the Eurozone; it has had to recruit around 1,000 officials for its supervisory 
arm and now employs a fifth of all banking supervisory staff in the Eurozone.29 Moreover, the move 
towards a banking union had broader political ramifications: not only did it entail a degree of fiscal 
union (through the prospect of cross-border liabilities for failing banks and transfers of public funds), 
but it was also perceived by many actors as ‘a vote of confidence…from the euro area’s political 
leaders,’30 which enabled Mario Draghi to announce a few weeks later that the ECB would do ‘whatever 
it takes’ to save the euro. 
This episode, together with the bolstering of the Commission’s surveillance powers over 
macroeconomic policy, illustrates the remarkable character of the developments that have unfolded over 
the course of the euro crisis. In both cases, despite Member States’ traditional sovereignty concerns, 
supranational institutions have seen their powers significantly increased in areas of strategic importance. 
Equally remarkably, the final result appears to owe much to the agency of the most directly concerned 
institutions, namely the Commission and the European Central Bank, which played a major role in the 
design of key innovations of the period and advocated for reform. Both the process and the output are 
difficult to reconcile with the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ literature that has developed in the wake of 
the crisis, for which the crisis confirmed the pre-eminence acquired by the European Council in the post-
Maastricht era.31 
Be that as it may, in both cases transfers of authority to the European level were a response to the 
perceived weakness of earlier enforcement mechanisms in which national authorities were supposed to 
apply the rules to themselves, and therefore had incentives for collusion and horse-trading.32 North-
South mistrust had reached such high levels that creditor countries insisted on the ‘depoliticisation’ of 
enforcement mechanisms. And, as stressed by former President of the European Council, Herman van 
Rompuy, ‘in the EU, there is only one way to depoliticise a process: it is to ‘communitarise’ it.’33 By so 
doing, however, the democratic deficit has been aggravated. Innovations such as the European Semester 
and the creation of fiscal policy councils in the constitutional system of the Member States, imposed by 
the Fiscal Compact, were deliberately conceived to curtail the autonomy enjoyed by national authorities 
in the handling of their fiscal policy. The hope of creditor countries was clearly that the more detailed 
character of the revised and extended SGP would likewise constrain EU institutions. Elections could no 
longer reverse the stream: as illustrated by Greece’s failed attempt to reject austerity in 2015, the 
alternative was between staying within the Eurozone and complying with its rules or leaving it 
altogether.  
To make things worse, these fundamental changes were adopted against a background of fading 
support for European integration in the general public. Tellingly, national leaders’ reactions at the 
beginning of the crisis downplayed the part to be played by EU institutions. French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy was quite blunt: 
The crisis has prompted the heads of state and government to assume greater responsibilities because 
at the end of the day, they alone have the democratic legitimacy to make decisions. European  
In softer language, Chancellor Merkel heralded the emergence of a new ‘Union Method,’ in which 
intergovernmental actors were to play a larger role than before. However, the dramatic character of the 
crisis, which called into question the very existence of the common currency, forced national leaders to 
                                                     
29 Nicolas Veron, Europe’s Radical Banking Union (Brussels: Bruegel, 2015). 
30 Veron, Europe’s Radical Banking Union, 18.  
31 Christopher Bickerton, Dermot Hodson, and Uwe Puetter, The New Intergovernmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015). 
32 Marco Buti, Sylvester Eijffinger, and Daniele Franco, “Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal 
Adjustment,” ECPR Discussion Paper, No. 180, 2003. 
33 Interview with Herman Van Rompuy, April 2015. 
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accept as necessary decisions which did not respond to their deep preferences,34 through a process which 
some of them subsequently denounced as a plot orchestrated by European technocrats.35 
II. The Europeanisation of Domestic Politics 
As the European Union underwent the arguably most severe crisis of its history, with potentially radical 
consequences for its member countries, EU membership came to feature more prominently in domestic 
political debates. This was in line with earlier studies, which had highlighted similar phenomena in 
previous years. Looking at votes in Austria, Sweden, and Finland at the time of their accession to the 
EU, for instance, Tillman had already found that the membership issue garnered much attention on these 
occasions, and that voters’ assessment of political parties’ stance on this issue had an impact on their 
voting choice.36 Similarly, in a comparison of elections in the 1992-2002 period, De Vries determined 
that European integration matters had a strong impact in several countries.37 
Returning to the euro crisis, as is known, the financial market turmoil that followed the discovery of 
a huge deficit in Greece in 2009 led to the adoption of financial aid packages for several countries that 
no longer could finance themselves on the market. In addition, the countries that benefitted from such 
programmes were forced to accept strict austerity programmes in order to restore their public finances. 
In such a context, it is hardly surprising that partisan conflict developed over European issues. 
The Europeanisation of domestic politics has been most acute in the country most affected by the 
crisis, i.e. Greece. Following a massive assistance package put together by the IMF and the EU in April 
2010—the largest in the history of all international bailouts—the government led by George Papandreou 
had to commit to a programme of stringent austerity measures coupled with a number of controversial 
reforms, thereby triggering a wave of protests. The ensuing elections shook the pillars of the Greek 
political system. In May 2012, the two parties that had dominated post-dictatorship politics, consistently 
securing over three quarters of the vote, PASOK (centre-left) and New Democracy (centre-right), only 
gained 32% of the vote, while anti-bailout, anti-establishment and populist forces made substantial 
gains, with left-wing party Syriza emerging as one of the main winners.38 Subsequently, the fiscal 
adjustment programme, with its corollary of privatisation, welfare cuts, and dismissals of public officials 
exacted high social costs, particularly for vulnerable categories such as young persons and elderly 
pensioners; Greece witnessed a brutal GDP collapse and a dramatic increase in unemployment (close to 
28% in 2013). No wonder then that elections were largely orchestrated as a debate on austerity and the 
country’s continued membership in the Eurozone. This ‘Europeanisation’ of Greek politics culminated 
in a dramatic sequence in 2015, with the victory of Syriza in the January parliamentary elections, the 
rejection of the adjustment programme proposed by the EU in a referendum organised in June, and 
ultimately the confirmation of Syriza’s leader, Alexis Tsipras, as prime minister in the parliamentary 
elections held in September.  
In an analysis of the January 2015 parliamentary vote, Katsanidou and Otjes argue that it is no longer 
possible to think of economic issues without considering the relationship between Greece and the 
Union.39 They therefore develop a two-dimensional model of the Greek party system: one dimension 
                                                     
34 Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism,” Journal of European 
Integration 36, no. 3 (2014): 321-37. 
35 Matteo Renzi, Avanti. Perché l'Italia non si Ferma (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2017). 
36 Tillman, “The European Union at the Ballot Box?.” 
37 De Vries, “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?.” 
38 Sofia Vasilopoulou and Daphne Halikiopoulou, “In the Shadow of Grexit: The Greek Election of 17 June 2012,” South 
European Society and Politics 18, no. 4 (2013): 523-42. 
39 Alexia Katsanidou and Simon Otjes, “Mapping the Greek Party System after the 2015 Elections: How the Economy and 
Europe Have Merged into a Single Issue,” LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog, February 25, 2015, 
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for cultural issues such as immigration and security) and another for European issues, including both 
economic policy and matters related to European integration. This structuring makes it easier to 
understand Syriza’s decision to seek an alliance with the right-wing ANEL party, with which they agreed 
on the most burning issue of the time, i.e. the necessity to renegotiate the terms of the bailout, even 
though the two parties were opposed on many socio-cultural issues. 
In many respects, the Greek elections represent an extreme form of Europeanisation, since 
membership in the EU was at stake, with potentially dramatic repercussions. Yet such situations remain 
rare outside of crisis periods. Most analyses of the Europeanisation of parties or political systems, 
however, continue to reduce the debate over Europe to a single, overarching issue: support for European 
integration or for membership in the EU.40 One might however wonder whether this approach is 
appropriate in view of the multifaceted nature of the integration process. EU public policy now covers 
a wide range of areas that extends well beyond the original core of internal market policies. The 
Europeanisation literature has shown that the impact of Europe can be strong even in the absence of any 
legislative action, for instance as a result of the macroeconomic surveillance procedure.41 As a result, 
even when a policy debate does not explicitly revolve around the need for more or less integration, EU 
membership may matter a lot. When asked about the subjects that influence their vote, respondents 
routinely mention issues such as immigration, unemployment, education or the future of the welfare 
system.42 Although all these fields fall under national jurisdiction more so than under EU jurisdiction, 
the interdependence of European countries and the control exercised by the Union over domestic public 
finances makes it difficult to discuss such matters without taking into account the existence of European 
constraints. 
The relation to Europe can therefore no longer be reduced to a single issue of support for integration. 
In their attempt to differentiate themselves from their rivals, parties and candidates will increasingly 
mobilise ‘Europeanised’ issues, i.e. issues which can be directly or indirectly influenced by EU 
memberships, even if they are not primarily interested in integration matters. This will in turn affect the 
way the issues in question are perceived by the general public. Surveys and other efforts to assess the 
importance of European issues in domestic elections should therefore take account of the full range of 
EU-related issues. The ‘European discourse’ is being transformed. It is no longer merely limited to 
offering a broad view on the best way to organise the continent, but rather indicates how Member State 
parties and politicians intend to manage their relationship with Brussels and other Member States in key 
areas.43 Considering the range of issues addressed at the EU level, there are reasons to believe that this 
is not a temporary development, but rather a structural shift in domestic politics. 
Another remarkable feature of crisis-time elections is their negative character. When European issues 
are addressed in election campaigns, it is generally to underscore the parties’ and candidates’ opposition 
to developments in Brussels. Contestation over issues regarding Europe can however take different 
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forms.44 The first is radical and complete opposition: the very idea of integration is rejected, along with 
its attendant sovereignty losses. This is traditionally the position of many anti-establishment political 
entrepreneurs from both the far left and the far right, who have regularly mobilised the EU issue to reap 
electoral gains.45 A second, less direct, line of opposition focuses on the policies pursued by the 
European Union or on the position of other Member States, but stops short of calling into question the 
very existence of the Union—a tack taken by many center-left parties across Europe. The novelty of the 
crisis period, however, has been that many representatives of ‘mainstream’ parties, traditionally well 
disposed towards the EU, have come to adopt a similar stance. Political leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy 
in France and Matteo Renzi in Italy deliberately surfed on the loss of support for European integration 
to engage in systematic ‘Brussels bashing’ or in a critique of other European countries. Even former 
European Commissioner Mario Monti found it necessary to warn of the dangers of ‘creditocrazia,’ a 
system in which all decisions would be dictated by countries with sound public finances, irrespective of 
their partners’ situation.46 As a rule, this discursive shift has contributed to fanning the flames of Euro-
scepticism.47  
III. Towards Politicisation of EU Policy-Making?  
Politicisation has also gained ground at the European level. With the innovation known as the system of 
Spitzenkandidaten, introduced in the 2014 European Parliament elections, the European Parliament has 
gained influence over the appointment of the Commission president. The Spitzenkandidaten system 
drew on a practice dating back to the beginning of the 1980s: the ‘confirmation vote’—an investiture of 
sorts, later codified by the Treaty of Maastricht, which also aligned the term of commissioners with that 
of the Parliament. Although these reforms were introduced without any real debate, they clearly 
indicated a desire to strengthen the links between the Parliament and the body that most resembles an 
‘executive’ at the European level, i.e. the Commission. Subsequently, Members of the European 
Parliament requested the establishment of a system of hearings to confirm Commission candidates, 
based on the US Congress’ oversight of certain presidential nominations. After some hesitation, 
Commission president Jacques Santer accepted the principle, which was then enshrined in the 
Parliament’s rules of procedure.48 The hearings have proven to be a formidable challenge for certain 
candidates whose skills and opinions failed to impress the members of parliamentary committees. In 
each confirmation process, the Parliament has managed to impose changes in the distribution of 
portfolios, or even reject outright certain candidates. The forced resignation of the Santer Commission 
in 1999, triggered by the threat of a parliamentary vote of censure, reinforced the idea of a strong link 
between the Parliament and the executive. 
Given this momentum, it did not take very much imagination to see that political parties at the 
European level—another creation of the Maastricht Treaty—might one day be tempted to use elections 
as a lever to impose their choice of Commission president on governments.49 By 1998, Jacques Delors 
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and a number of EU figures called for European political parties to list their candidate for the presidency 
before the European elections.50 The idea was to give voters an opportunity to influence the choice of 
president, and even the Commission’s programme. The European socialist party in particular embraced 
this idea, following a number of electoral setbacks; many saw it as a possible remedy to citizens’ 
disenchantment with Europe. During the seventh legislature (2009-2014), European Parliament 
President Martin Schulz followed this playbook, leading to his selection as candidate of the European 
Socialist Party (PES). Despite the many reservations, especially within the European People’s Party 
(EPP) where heads of government frowned upon an initiative that could only reduce their leeway, once 
several parties put forward their candidates in the autumn of 2013, it began to appear inevitable. At a 
time when personalisation is an important element of political life, it was inconceivable to leave the 
media spotlight entirely to candidates from other parties.51 Thus Jean-Claude Juncker was chosen as the 
EPP’s candidate, and when the EPP won the plurality of the votes, he was named Commission president. 
His success, despite the opposition from prominent figures from within his own party such as Angela 
Merkel and Herman Van Rompuy, powerfully backed by British Prime Minister David Cameron after 
the elections, gives credence to the idea that a change did occur. Its magnitude remains to be assessed. 
A first observation is that the 2014 election results have only very partially met the expectations of 
the new system’s proponents. The victory of the European People’s Party was only relative: while it 
remained the largest group in the European Parliament, it lost close to 20% of its parliamentary 
representation (a total of fifty-three seats). The striking element of these elections was the decline of the 
four main European parties: in most countries, both left - and right-wing populist movements made the 
largest gains. Moreover, personalisation does not seem to have played a decisive role in voter choice. 
According to a post-election survey conducted in seven EU countries, on average only 36% of 
respondents (a mere 21% in Greece) believed that the choice of Commission president was important 
or very important, while 44%, (with a maximum of 48% in Germany), held the opposite view.52  
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Figure 1. Importance of the choice of Commission presidents in the 2014 European elections 
 
Source: Sauger, Dehousse, and Gougou, “Comparative Electoral Dynamics in the European Union in 2014.” 
The only consolation for the supporters of the Spitzenkandidaten system was that the idea appeared to 
be more popular with voters from the two largest parties (EPP and PES), whose candidates received the 
most media coverage because they were considered the only truly electable candidates. Furthermore, 
the countries where the Spitzenkandidaten campaigned experienced greater participation.53 This 
however did not suffice to reverse the well-established trend which has seen turnout at the polls decline 
at each successive election: in 2014, an all-time low of 42.6% was registered. 
Figure 2. Impact of Spitzenkandidaten on turnout at EU election 
 
Source: Sauger, Dehousse, and Gougou, “Comparative Electoral Dynamics in the European Union in 2014.” 
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Figure 2 compares variations in the turnout at the 2009 and 2014 elections with the intensity of support 
for the indirect election of the Commission president (operationalised as the number of points beyond 
the average in all countries polled in the survey). Evidently, there is little relation between the two. The 
country in which support was highest, i.e. Spain, even saw a decline in turnout. Conversely, in Greece, 
where the upsurge of interest for EU elections was strongest, support for the indirect election was the 
lowest. This result obtained despite the fact that the clear winner of the European elections in Greece, 
Alexis Tsipras, was the radical left’s candidate for the Commission presidency. In other words, there is 
no apparent correlation between strong public support for the idea of electing the Commission president 
and the turnout registered in 2014. 
This anointing of sorts through universal suffrage nonetheless sufficed to propel Jean-Claude Juncker 
to the head of the Commission. No alternative proposal emerged from European Council negotiations, 
and the virulence of the British and Hungarian opposition ended up rallying less enthusiastic Member 
States to his candidacy. In the Parliament, Juncker was subsequently confirmed by a ‘grand coalition’ 
of the EPP, socialist, and liberal members. While some raised the prospect of a true coalition agreement, 
similar to those that exist in some parliamentary systems, the achievements were more modest in the 
European context. Leadership positions in the Parliament were distributed to the detriment of euro-
sceptic groups, which did not secure the committee chairs that the principle of proportional 
representation suggested they might aspire to. And the relatively weak majority obtained by the 
Commission in the confirmation vote of October 22, 2014 (423 for, 209 against and 67 abstaining), with 
many abstentions among socialist representatives from Southern Europe, shows that no solid majority 
existed in the Parliament. As in the past, each piece of legislation that has gone forward has been based 
on ad hoc parliamentary coalitions.  
The new structure of the EU executive has mostly attracted attention because it includes a tier of 
vice-presidents, tasked with the implementation of key aspects of Junker’s programme. At the same 
time, it confirms the necessarily multi-partisan nature of the Commission’s operations: the economic 
and financial affairs portfolio, which was awarded to the French socialist Pierre Moscovici after much 
wrangling, places him in two working groups respectively headed by the Finnish liberal Jyrky Kattainen 
and by the EPP-affiliated Latvian conservative Valdis Dombrovskis. That being said, the executive’s 
priorities are directly drawn from Juncker’s campaign platform.54 The official discourse thus tends to 
emphasise the existence of a chain of command that connects the executive’s choices to the preferences 
that emerged from the vote. All in all, even though the idea of a leadership contest at the European level, 
in which voters have a decisive role, has had relatively little success in the polls, it seems to have been 
important for many actors in the nascent European political system.55 
That the European Parliament strongly supported this initiative is not a surprise, since the process is 
viewed (perhaps too hastily) as reinforcing its influence. What is most surprising, however, is the way 
Member State governments have accepted an institutional path that inevitably leads to a reduction of 
their own room for manoeuvre. This choice, which does not seem to be driven by self-interest, can 
probably be explained by ideational factors: with regard to democracy, the parliamentary system 
remains the reference political system in most European countries. As a result, when the issue of 
democracy arises it is difficult to oppose simple ideas that resonate with national political cultures.56 UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron, who made every effort to oppose the choice of Jean-Claude Juncker 
after the 2014 European elections, learned this lesson through bitter experience. The process that led to 
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the latter’s appointment was presented as self-evident. Parliamentary group leaders argued that since his 
party had won the elections, Juncker should naturally be chosen as Commission president, even though 
some of them had been his rivals in the presidential race, a principled discourse which proved to be 
difficult to rebuke. 
At the time of writing, the question of whether this experience will be repeated in the elections for 
the 2019-2024 cycle is still being debated. Given the Parliament’s and parties’ insistence on the 
Spitzenkandidaten system, it seems fairly likely that leading candidates will indeed be selected and run 
for the Commission presidency. But whether one of them will be selected for the job is a different matter. 
At the February 2018 meeting of EU 27 leaders, they strongly reasserted their rights to choose the 
Commission president independently. In the words of European Council President Donald Tusk: 
There is no automaticity in this process. The Treaty is very clear that it is the autonomous 
competence of the European Council to nominate the candidate, while taking into account the 
European elections, and having held appropriate consultations.57 
Yet in the same week, the European Parliament declared it would not support a candidate for 
Commission president who had not fought in the election. Evidently, the transformation of the election 
process of the Commission president is far from complete.  
IV. The European Democracy Conundrum 
The euro crisis has had important consequences for the political system of the European Union. In 
several respects, it appears to have aggravated the well-known ‘democratic deficit’ of the European 
Union.58 Under the pressure of events, national governments have accepted transfers of powers to 
supranational institutions in areas of strategic importance. As a result, the discretion they enjoyed in the 
conduct of macroeconomic policy has been further eroded, particularly in debtor countries, submitted 
to a strict surveillance programme. This change, taking place in a period of weakened support for 
European integration, has had a strong impact on domestic politics, particularly in Eurozone countries. 
The influence of the EU is now felt more clearly in a large number of fields, which has fed opposition 
to Europe and/or to its policies. In parallel, one has witnessed an attempt to enhance the importance of 
European elections and possibly the responsiveness of the EU political system with the development of 
the so-called Spitzenkandidaten system.  
To sum up, reactions to the crisis have exposed the contradictions between two models of European 
governance: delegation of powers to independent supranational bodies, which is the hallmark of the 
‘Community method’; and a form of parliamentary government through the Spitzenkandidaten system. 
EU politics seem to oscillate between these two poles, at times anxious to keep partisan politics at bay; 
at other times eager to see political parties mobilise themselves around European issues. The 
contradiction between a ‘trusteeship’ model and a form of parliamentary government is by no means 
new. It was already present at earlier stages of the construction of the EU institutional architecture.59 
However, with the euro crisis and the accelerated institutional development that has resulted, some 
blatant incompatibilities have emerged. 
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Consider for instance the way in which the Juncker Commission has used its enhanced control 
powers over domestic fiscal policies. In recent years, countries like France and Italy, whose fiscal 
policies did not fully respect European recommendations, were granted a considerable degree of 
flexibility.60 In so doing, the Juncker Commission followed a line that was clearly less drastic than that 
of the Barroso Commission. To its critics in ‘creditor countries,’ the Commission responded that it was 
now (read: after Juncker’s election) a political body, which had to take into consideration the domestic 
situation in the Member States. It is highly likely that the large swing towards Eurosceptic parties 
registered in the 2014 European elections played a role in its evaluations. 
Although the introduction of politics through the Spitzenkandidaten system has been used by some 
to legitimize the Commission, others have drawn precisely the opposite conclusion. For supporters of 
rules-based governance, the idea that the European executive claims for itself the right to decide, on the 
basis of a variety of factors, including political ones, how best to implement the rules appears to be 
nonsense. In this view, the Commission enjoys the powers it does precisely because of the neutral, super 
partes status it enjoys in the EU. In other words, the logic of delegation of powers to neutral agents that 
characterised the first decades of European integration61 is at odds with a logic of politicisation of EU 
policy-making.62 Unsurprisingly, in the last few years there have been signals indicating a willingness 
in some quarters to re-examine the role devoted to the European Commission. In 2015, for instance, 
Germany’s powerful finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble resurrected an old plan to strip the 
Commission of certain regulatory and oversight functions, beginning with competition policy, and to 
give them to independent authorities in order to maintain ‘depoliticised’ supervision of state activities.63 
A few months later, the German government wrote to German members of the European Parliament to 
stress that the Commission could not claim both the status of political representative and the role of 
impartial guardian of the Treaties.64 
To make things worse, today’s Europe is characterised by widespread opposition to ‘Brussels’ and 
by growing polarisation. To the well-known North-South cleavage on economic issues, one must add 
an East-West split over the free movement of persons. Even populist movements, which share a common 
aversion for the establishment, appear to pursue different objectives: the South, with movements like 
Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, has predominantly left-wing populism, whereas, in the North, 
right-wing populism with strong identity components is pervasive. Given these divisions, steering a 
course that rallies majority support is anything but easy, irrespective of the governance model—
parliamentary or trusteeship—that one has in mind. 
In the long run, the fundamental contradictions between these two governance models will have to 
be addressed. One possibility is to draw a line between areas in which a more politicised logic is accepted 
and those in which neutral third parties acting in the general interest is preferred. In the turbulent 
environment in which Europe finds itself, it is hard to say how the tension between the two governance 
models will play out over time. Moreover, the growth of populism and opposition to Europe registered 
in a number of countries is likely to lead Member State governments to insist on retaining a central role 
in EU governance. The logic of incremental change experienced by the EU throughout the course of its 
history may no longer suffice to define a new balance. 
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